Climate Action 100+ targets several French companies, including TotalEnergies, Danone, Saint-Gobain, Stellantis, and Engie, which are responsible for a significant share of global industrial emissions.

Influence is exercised in practice when managers vote against resolutions deemed insufficient on ESG matters, such as refusing to approve executive compensation disconnected from climate targets or opposing inadequate sustainability reports.

The FIR-ADEME analysis assigns an average ACT performance score of only 43% to the companies concerned, with an average rating of 'C', indicating insufficient implementation of climate strategies.

The channels of influence include exercising voting rights at general meetings and shareholder engagement. The first channel is exercised by voting against insufficient resolutions on ESG matters, while the second relies on interactions between investors and companies to improve ESG practices or reporting, as illustrated by the Engagement Platform of the Forum pour l'Investissement Responsable.

Under the loi de sécurité financière of 2003, French asset management companies must develop a voting policy and report on their practices. This obligation is reinforced by Article L.533-22 of the Code monétaire et financier.

Shareholder engagement is defined by the Principles for Responsible Investment as interactions between investors and investee entities aimed at influencing ESG practices or improving reporting. It can be bilateral or collaborative.

The AMF's SPOT inspections conducted in 2024 reveal that resolutions on environmental and social issues remain insufficient, which limits the actual influence of voting on these dimensions.

The French legal framework limits the authority of the general meeting to decisions provided for by law and requires a 0.5% capital threshold to file a resolution, which constitutes an obstacle. Conversely, the transposition of the Shareholder Rights Directive II facilitates shareholder identification and information transmission.